
Labour's First Year
Ethan Ilzetzki and Marta Grzana
Friday, August 8
​​​
Summary
The July 2025 CfM-CEPR survey asked the members of its panel the Labour government’s first year in power. There is relatively broad consensus that the Labour government’s policies are a mixed bag in their growth implications but differ in how they weigh the net effects of the policies. While almost half of the panellists believe that the overall effect of Labour’s policies on economic growth is modestly positive, a rough third of the panellists think the policies will harm economic growth moderately or substantially. Moreover, nearly half believe that the government has taken an excessive focus on limiting public borrowing, while about a third of the panel believe the balance between fiscal responsibility and other aims, including growth, to be just right.
Background
The July 2025 CfM-CEPR survey asked the members of its panel to evaluate the government’s performance in promoting growth and fiscal sustainability. Panellists were asked to assess the net effect of Labour’s policies in its first year on economic growth and living standards. Furthermore, the panel was asked to evaluate how well has the government balanced fiscal responsibility against other aims over the last year.
Labour’s first year
A year has passed since the Labour government came into office after 14 years of Conservative rule. The incoming government made several pledges, focused around five main missions: (1) secure the highest sustained growth in G7, (2) make Britain a clean energy superpower, (3) build an NHS fit for the future, (4) make Britain’s streets safe, and (5) break down barriers to opportunity at every stage (Labour Party, 2024).
The government has implemented a number of ambitious policies designed to fulfill each of its missions. In order to deliever on the pledge of 1.5 million new homes over the course of the Parliament, it introduced the Planning and Infrastructure Bill (PIB) and updated the National Planning Policy Framework to fast-track approvals for housing and at least 150 nationally significant infrustructure projects (Pennycook, 2025). The OBR predicts that the government is on track to build an additional 1.3 million houses which would contribute an estimated 0.2% to growth by 2030, and potentially up to 0.4% by 2035. The forecast did not account for the planning reform or the Affordable Homes Programme (£2 billion so far has been allocated to create 18,000 affordable homes, with more expected to come), yet the prediction was still the biggest positive growth effect from a ‘zero-cost’ policy that the OBR has ever forecast (Tonybee, 2025).
The government has also sought to increase public investment as a way to catalyze growth in key sectors and attract increased foreign investment. It introduced the National Wealth Fund which has unlocked 9,900 jobs and almost £1.8 billion in private investment in its first few months (HM Treasury, 2025). Just before the Spending Review, the government announced £15 billion for transport outside London, £14.2 billion for a new nuclear power plant, and nearly £40 billion on affordable housing over the next 10 years. The impact of the government’s public spending policies could be substantial, but it might not be felt for years (Crerar, 2025). For instance, the NIESR estimates that a 1% increase in public spending as a share of GDP would translate to a 2.2-2.9% increase in long-run GDP (using a model with a 35 year time horizon) (Michail, 2025).
The Chancellor has committed to adhering to the government’s fiscal rules, while modifying them to exempt public investments. In the Autumn 2024 Budget, Chancellor Rachel Reeves raised taxes, including increases to National Insurance Contributions, Capital Gains Tax, and VAT on private schools, all amounting to an additional £40 billion to cover increased public spending (Reeves, 2024). There are over 250 thousand fewer employees than last year, especially in the hospitality and retail sectors, and this may be in part due to the rising tax burden on employers. Tax hikes may have also held back economic growth this year (Dharshini, 2025). In March, when the economic outlook deteriorated, Reeves introduced welfare cuts to avoid more tax hikes or halting public spending plans (Tetlow, 2025).
Labour’s first year ends with no clearer growth outlook for the UK than a year ago. From the start of January to the end of March, the UK was roughly in the middle of the G7 in terms of economic growth. The IMF forecasts that the UK’s growth rate will be 1.2% in 2025, roughly the same as in 2024, but projects a slight improvement in the medium term. In the first six months of the Labour government, disposable income per quarter rose by £144, but then fell by £81 in March, still making it the fastest growth since Thatcher’s third term. At the same time, average wages increased by 5%, outpacing inflation, which stood at 3.4% in May (Dunford & Coates, 2025). The OBR highlights that substantial uncertainty in economic and fiscal forecasts, driven by sensitivity to shocks and forecast errors, may undermine the government’s ability to meet its fiscal targets given the fine fiscal margin with which Chancellor Reeves is working (OBR, 2025).
Question 1: How will the sum total of the Labour government’s policy interventions in its first year contribute to economic growth and living standards over the course of the parliament?


Sixteen panellists responded to this question. Over 40% of the panellists believe that the Labour government’s policy interventions in its first year would contribute moderately to economic growth and living standards over the course of the parliament. A quarter of the panel believes that the policies would have no effect on growth. Roughly a third of the panel believes that Labour’s first year policies would harm growth, with almost 20% saying that the harm would be moderate and slightly over 10% saying that the harm would be substantial. When weighting these answers by experts’ self-assessed confidence, the share of panellists who believe that the policies would have no effect or contribute to growth remains roughly the same. While fewer stated that the policies would harm growth, some are emphatically opposed to them and are very confident that their harmful effect would be substantial.
When looking at the panellists’ individual answers, there is broad consensus on which policies were positive for growth and which were harmful, with the differences in opinion reflecting diverging views on their net effect.
Most panellists agreed that the Labour government has taken steps to increase public investment, which should promote growth. Charles Bean (LSE) says that: “over the long-term - and mainly beyond the lifetime of this Parliament - the step up in public investment should boost potential output”. Thomas Sampson (LSE) agrees that: “the steps Labour have taken to increase public investment should bring moderate medium-to-long term benefits”, but adds that these steps: “are unlikely to transform the fortunes of the British economy”.
Panellists also mention the efforts on reducing energy costs, and regulations around private investment as policies yielding positive impact on growth. Ricardo Reis (LSE) sums up that: “There were some opportunities taken: removing regulatory barriers to private investment, some public investment projects, some improvements in energy production”. Charles Bean (LSE) adds that: “A reduction in regulations on e.g. planning, should also help”.
There is general consensus that this is a piecemeal approach that will have no more than a moderate effect on economic growth. James Smith (Resolution Foundation) summarizes this view: “The government's approach to boosting growth has been to focus on a large number of small, supply-side measures, including on infrastructure, regulation, planning and energy costs. These should boost growth modestly, albeit with a lag”. Other panelists point to missed opportunities for bolder change. Thomas Sampson (LSE) says that: “Despite the mantra that growth is the number one priority, the government has often chosen political expediency over boosting growth. For example, rejoining the EU's single market and customs union would boost GDP by several percentage points, a much larger gain than offered by any of the policies the government has implemented”. James Smith (Resolution Foundation) also points out that: “More can be done, particularly on trade and industrial policy and tech adoption, where the UK appears to be particularly weak”.
On the negative side of the ledger, the panel focuses on tax increases that may affect labor supply, productivity, and lead to capital flight. Ricardo Reis (LSE) says that: “there have also been some negative steps, like the tax and visa policies that harm two of the most competitive and productive sectors in the country (finance and higher education), and the combination of policies discouraging hours worked”. Roger Farmer (University of Warwick) adds that: “high tax policies are catalyzing an exodus of the high net worth individuals who make up much of the tax base”. Charles Bean (LSE) refers to the increasing in employers’ National Insurance Contribution, saying that: “in the near term, however, potential output is likely to be depressed by the ill-judged reduction in the employer NI threshold in combination with the rise in the NLW, which will render unviable a swath of low productivity jobs in sectors such as hospitality and retailing”. He suggests that: “It would be far better simply to e.g. abolish the age limit on employee NI contributions, so effectively equalising the rate at which income is taxed between the young and old, or else raise the standard rate of income tax appropriately”.
Additionally, some panellists also anticipate fiscal tightening and future tax rises, and estimate the potential effects of such policies to come. Charles Bean (LSE) claims that: “To the extent that the U-turns on pensioner winter fuel payments and disability benefits imply a further increase in taxes in the autumn Budget, then that may impart a further depressing effect if the taxes are not well chosen”. Michael Wickens (Cardiff Business School & University of York) says that: “The worsening public finances will shortly increase the tax burden on the minority who pay taxes and deter economic activity further. With such economically illiterate policies their long-term aspirations for GDP growth are doomed to failure”.
Some also mention Labour’s immigration policies as having a negative effect on growth. Roger Farmer (University of Warwick) believes that: “the continuation of the policy of following the dictates of the ECHR as regards immigration are fast leading to civil unrest”. He also adds that: “net zero policies are leading to an exodus of manufacturing”.
Concluding, Michael Wickens (Cardiff Business School & University of York) evaluates Labour’s policies by saying that: “An objective assessment of Labour government policies shows that they are majoritarian. In pursuit of ideological policies on welfare, energy and immigration paid for by the tax-paying minority they are deterring the growth that they claim is a priority. Demand for resources, including housing, is outstripping supply as the economy is shackled”. Ricardo Reis (LSE) assesses the net impact of the policies, saying that: “Overall, the net effect may be close to zero. It is a shame, since the negatives did not have to be there offsetting the positives”. Finally, Andrea Ferrero (University of Oxford) points out that: “Global uncertainty, related to tariffs, the Russia-Ukraine war and the political situation in the Middle East, is still the dominating factor in the macro outlook so the effect of the proposed domestic policies is likely to be secondary”.
Question 2: How well has the government balanced fiscal responsibility against other aims (e.g. economic growth)?
​
​


Sixteen panellists responded to this question. Over 40% of the panellists think that the government was too constrained in is approach to public borrowing, while almost a third (slightly over 30%) think that the government balanced fiscal responsibility against other aims just right. Only a minority of 5% of respondents believe that the government was not strict enough on limiting borrowing.
Most panellists believe that the government got the balance just right, yet the limited fiscal headroom undermines tax stability. Charles Bean (LSE) says: “I am broadly sympathetic with the general idea of borrowing in order to finance productive investment while aiming to balance (or better) the current public budget, unless there are major adverse shocks. However, the Chancellor made a cardinal error in her first budget by choosing to operate with such a small margin of fiscal headroom. The consequence is that fiscal policy has become a continual exercise of fine-tuning policy in order to control the OBR's central projection for the relevant fiscal measures several years ahead. This is a batty way to conduct fiscal policy and has led to decisions on e.g. benefits that were plainly driven by the need to find a given quantum of savings, rather than on their own merits”. Ricardo Reis (LSE) echoes that thought and suggests that: “On the one hand, tight deficit rules have led to tax rates that are changing frequently. This is the opposite of tax smoothing and has hurt economic activity. But on the other hand, public debt is high, and the equilibrium interest rate paid on it is forever higher (see paper). Fiscal responsibility is necessary after so many years of neglect. Embracing more public borrowing would be reckless”.
Panellists also point to the risks coming from financial markets as an effect of the tight fiscal position. James Smith (Resolution Foundation) suggests that: “The public finances remain very stretched with evidence of very sharp tradeoffs and difficult choices at each of the Government's fiscal events so far. The new fiscal rules have been ambitious in terms of the extent to which they have allowed borrowing to increase. And that has contributed to jitters in financial markets around the cost of servicing the UK's large debts. Looking ahead, then, a key priority for the Budget should be taking steps to reinforce the credibility of its fiscal management”.
Some panellists rejected the premise of the question, arguing that there is no real trade-off between growth and fiscal responsibility, since pro-growth policies may cause deficits in the short run but lead to fiscal sustainability in the long run. Roger Farmer (University of Warwick) explains that: “Fiscal responsibility does not have to mean austerity. Rachel Reeves rightly asserted that a policy that pursues growth can potentially allow for both continued public spending and an increased living standard”. He also adds that: “Regrettably, the policies that are now in place are having the opposite effect”. Michael Wickens (Cardiff Business School & University of York) agrees with the notion and suggests that: “before spending more and borrowing more or raising taxes to pay for it, sustainability requires first creating the extra income that generates the required tax revenues”.
Finally, some members of the panel believe that fiscal responsibility is crucial but contrast fiscal responsibility with a strict adherence to fiscal rules in their current formulation. Ethan Ilzetzki (LSE) endorses the view, along with Thomas Sampson (LSE) who explains that: 2Fiscal responsibility is important, but that is not the same as meeting the government's somewhat arbitrary fiscal rules based on somewhat unreliable OBR forecasts”. David Cobham (Heriot-Watt University) expands on the notion and claims that: “The Labour party should have refused to fall into the trap set by the Tories in the last general election, and should now change the remit for the OBR to prevent such dirty tricks in the future”.
References
​
Crerar, P. (2025, June 11). Labour bets on investment, but will Britons see change before the next election? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jun/11/labour-bets-on-investment-but-will-britons-see-change-before-the-next-election
Dharshini, D. (2025, July 4). BBC reporters assess Labour government's performance one year in. BBC. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/crenvyrnv33o
Dunford, D., & Coates, S. (2025, July 5). One year of Starmer: Nine charts that tell us whether Labour's first year has been a success or failure. Sky News. https://news.sky.com/story/one-year-of-starmer-nine-charts-that-tell-us-whether-labours-first-year-has-been-a-success-or-failure-13391544
HM Treasury. (2025, March 19). Chancellor's National Wealth Fund to deliver growth and boost security. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellors-national-wealth-fund-to-deliver-growth-and-boost-security
Labour Party. (2024). Change. Labour Party.
Michail, M. G. (2025, February 12). To What Extent Does Public Investment Impact Long-Run Output? NIESR. https://niesr.ac.uk/publications/what-extent-does-public-investment-impact-long-run-output?type=uk-economic-outlook-topical-feature
OBR. (2025, March 26). Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2025 - Office for Budget Responsibility. OBR. https://obr.uk/efo/economic-and-fiscal-outlook-march-2025/
Oliver, J., & Pickard, J. (2025, March 26). Planning reforms to boost UK housebuilding but Labour set to miss target. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/4f88cd6e-a3ab-470c-bc89-b4f76f0dd604
Pennycook, M. (2025, April 23). Further reforms to the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects regime. UK Parliament. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2025-04-23/hcws594
Reeves, R. (2024, October 30). Autumn Budget 2024 speech. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/autumn-budget-2024-speech
Tetlow, G. (2025, July 1). Reeves has made big fiscal choices but left herself little room for manoeuvre. Institute for Government. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/comment/one-year-labour-economy
Tonybee, P. (2025, April 18). Britain needs houses, and Labour’s bold plan will address that. But it may require more migrants. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/apr/18/britain-houses-labour-plan-more-migrants-skills-gap
